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ABSTRACT
In a recent paper, Sun Demirli (2010) proposes 
an allegedly new way of conceiving of 
individuation in the context of the bundle theory 
of object constitution. He suggests that allowing 
for distance relations to individuate objects 
solves the problems with worlds containing 
indiscernible objects that would otherwise 
affect the theory. The aim of the present paper 
is i) To show that Demirli’s proposal falls short 
of achieving this goal and ii) To carry out a 
more general critical assessment of the issue by 
appraising the costs and benefits of Demirli’s 
view as well as of existing alternatives.
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Introduction
When studying the ontological nature 
of material objects, it is necessary to 
distinguish the question of their internal 
composition from the question of their 
individuation. The former question 
concerns what constitutes a material object 
as such, and in what way. It aims to identify 
the categories of entities that partake in the 
making up of material things. The latter 
question has instead to do with how each 
object is individuated as such, self-identical 
and numerically distinct from everything 
else and, consequently, counting as one 
thing of a given kind.
The bundle theory accounts for the internal 
constitution of objects by postulating that 
they are entirely composed of collections 
of repeatable properties (universals) ‘glued 
together’ by compresence or some other 
fundamental relation. Such a theory is 
usually taken to lead to the ‘constitutional 
approach’ to individuation and, as a result, 
to the Leibnizian Principle of the Identity 
of the Indiscernibles (henceforth, PII). 
The idea is that if, as the constitutional 
approach to individuation has it, the 
constituents of individual objects are the 
only ground for these objects’ identities, 
since universals are numerically identical 
across their instances there cannot be 
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numerically distinct objects with all the same properties. Bundle theorists may avoid 
this conclusion by introducing ‘special’ universals with only one instance, acting as 
‘individuating essences’ or ‘haecceitates’ that uniquely pick out one object each – 
something like ‘being Socrates’.1 This, though, is normally regarded as unsatisfactory. 
The reason is that the bundle theorist’s fundamental working presupposition is that 
the world as an assortment of material objects is constituted entirely by instances 
of repeatable qualities, with no constraint other than the mutual compatibility 
of the latter. The special universals mentioned above, however, would be uniquely 
connected to specific collections of properties in a way that appears to presuppose (or 
at any rate introduce) non-qualitatively-analysable identities (the labels ‘primitive 
identity’ and ‘primitive thisness’ are often used). Moreover, the supposed individuating 
essences would be metaphysical posits additional to the ‘canonical’ properties of 
things. If, however, the constitutional approach to individuation does in fact make 
bundle theorists committed to PII, a problem arises: the resulting framework seems 
unable to make room for Black-type (Black 1952) worlds, inhabited by two or more 
objects constituted by the same properties and nothing else, but such worlds appear 
perfectly possible. It follows that bundle theorists need to say something more about 
individuation and indiscernibility.
The present paper discusses extant attempts to do this, with special focus on an 
allegedly new view recently proposed by Sun Demirli (Demirli 2010). It will be argued 
that Demirli’s proposal is neither new nor successful as a solution to the problem 
of indiscernibility. In addition to this, on the basis of a more general comparative 
assessment, it will be suggested that facts of identity that are fundamental and not 
derivative – in particular, not derivative on facts concerning the distribution of qualities 
in the world – should be acknowledged. (This may or may not be deemed sufficient for 
abandoning the bundle theory – although we will have something to say on this issue, 
reaching a definitive verdict on this is not amongst the aims of this paper). 
The structure of the essay is as follows: Section 1 outlines and discusses a proposal 
put forward by John O’Leary-Hawthorne, according to which the bundle theorist 
should ‘bite the bullet’ and defend a seemingly counterintuitive interpretation of the 
view s/he endorses in order to make sense of Black-type worlds; Section 2 considers 
an alternative, presented by Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, and purported to solve 
the problem by postulating a distinction between bundles of universals and their 
instances; Section 3 critically assesses Demirli’s (allegedly) new view, based on broadly 
‘structuralist’ considerations; and Section 4 concludes the discussion by summarising 
its main results, and hinting at some considerations in favour of primitive identities.
1. O’Leary-Hawthorne: Indiscernibles are Numerically Identical 
O’Leary-Hawthorne (1995) contends that the bundle theorist should embrace PII 
without interpreting it as ruling out the possibility of indiscernibility. In more detail, 
he argues that, exactly in the same way in which a single universal can exist at many 
places, so can a bundle of several universals. It follows from this that Black’s alleged 
1 This is, for instance, what Loux (1978) does with his ‘substance theory of substance’.
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counterexample to PII is immediately neutralised: the seemingly distinct indiscernible 
objects are in fact a multiply-located, numerically unique object. In particular, if – as 
contended by many realists about universals – universals are immanent (that is, they 
exist in space and time only) and are capable of existence at many places at the same 
time, then:
[t]he following possibility is a very genuine one: There is a bundle [...] five 
feet from itself and nothing else. (O’Leary-Hawthorne 1995, 193)
Vallicella (1997) objects to this that it requires bundles of universals to be like single 
universals in their multiple instantiability (i.e., their ability to exist at many places, 
possibly grouped with other universals), but: i) It is by no means obvious that what is 
true of universals is true of bundles of universals (to take this for granted would be an 
instance of the ‘fallacy of composition’: for example, atoms are invisible to the naked 
eye, but human bodies – although they are composed of atoms – certainly aren’t!); 
ii) Indeed, while universals get instantiated, bundles cannot, for they are particulars 
and particulars – by definition – do not get instantiated; and iii) Even if it were a 
potentially repeatable entity, a bundle could not possibly get instantiated because, since 
every bundle is ‘complete’ (i.e., it is identical to the sum of all the bundled universals 
it comprises and only those), no bundle can be bundled together with other universals 
not in the bundle.
This is substantially correct, but there is an easy reply to Vallicella’s objection. It goes 
as follows: it is indeed only universals, not bundles, that get instantiated at different 
places; but if, say, a universal A can be instantiated at locations x and y at the same 
time, so can another universal B; and since it can consequently be the case that both 
universal A and universal B get instantiated at both x and y, the possibility of two 
indiscernible and numerically identical AB-bundles, i.e., objects, is ipso facto obtained 
without anything like the multiple instantiation of a full-blown bundle. In other 
words, it may be inaccurate to say that bundles get instantiated but, pace Vallicella, 
O’Leary-Hawthorne’s account of individuation does not depend on an assumption to 
that effect.
But how should one count multiply-located objects? In a co-authored paper (O’Leary-
Hawthorne and Cover 1998), O’Leary-Hawthorne elaborates on his proposal and 
contends that ordinary people do not count by strict metaphysical identity, which 
correctly counts qualitatively identical universal-instances and bundles only once; but 
by what one may call loose – or folk – identity, which takes location as an individuating 
factor when, strictly speaking, it is not.2 Since the bundle theorist’s claim that PII 
is necessarily true is only at odds with the latter (less philosophically relevant) way 
of counting things, O’Leary-Hawthorne concludes, the possibility of indiscernibles 
doesn’t constitute a problem for the bundle theory. 
Rodriguez-Pereyra (2004, 75) protests that this account of individuation cannot make 
2 This is, clearly, a confirmation of the fact that O’Leary-Hawthorne is assuming the constitutional approach to 
individuation. 
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sense of the difference between an object that exists at two places and objects that exist 
at three, four or more places (a distinction that seems eminently plausible given that 
one can conceive of Black-type worlds with any number of indiscernibles). O’Leary-
Hawthorne and Cover suggest that such a difference is grounded in the different 
n-adicity of distance relations: distance is dyadic in Black’s world, tryadic in a world 
with (what would look like) three qualitatively identical objects all at the same distance 
from each other, and so on. Rodriguez-Pereyra, however, considers it self-evident that 
all distance relations with three or more places are derivative on dyadic ones. Demirli 
(2010), on the other hand, defends O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cover by arguing that 
the reducibility of more complex distance relations to simpler dyadic ones only appears 
obvious under the assumption that objects possess primitive identities, an assumption 
that O’Leary-Hawthorne and Cover do not make and that, Demirli claims, is in fact 
problematic. Evidently, the issue is quite tangled. Primitive identities and distance 
relations will be discussed further later: for the moment, let us grant that Rodriguez-
Pereyra’s criticism is not lethal to O’Leary-Hawthorne’s proposal.
Moving on to a different point, it must be noticed that, although O’Leary-Hawthorne’s 
account of individuation within the bundle theory is internally consistent, it creates 
a non-negligible ‘gap’ between metaphysics and common sense. This is not to suggest 
that a theory (philosophical or otherwise) should always seek agreement with common 
sense: if anything, philosophy and science taught us that we should be ready to give up 
even the most entrenched commonsense beliefs about things. The point is, rather, that, 
ceteris paribus, a theory that creates a systematic distinction between the commonsense 
description of the observed phenomena and its proper, correct description should 
not be preferred to one that does not establish such a distinction. More in general, 
O’Leary-Hawthorne’s proposal rules out in principle worlds (with numerically distinct 
indiscernibles) that would appear perfectly possible. True, such account provides 
an explanation as to why this is the case, i.e., an argument to the effect that certain 
stipulations only give the impression of making ontological sense. However, it also 
appears to set a restriction on the domain of the metaphysically possible that one may 
wish to avoid by endorsing an alternative, equally explanatory, account of individuation 
(whether such an alternative account exists is, of course, still an open question).3 And 
matters are likely to become worse when it comes to properties: does the doubly located 
sphere inhabiting Black’s world really only have, say, unit mass? If so, don’t our best 
available empirical descriptions of the world (most notably, those provided by science) 
run the risk of being classified as ‘folk’? Or should we accept that bundles (can) include 
contradictory properties, such as ‘weighing 1 kg.’ and ‘weighing 2 kg.’?4
In view of the above, it seems fair to say that O’Leary-Hawthorne’s strategy for solving 
3  Demirli goes as far as to assert that O’Leary-Hawthorne’s theory “fails to address the very problem of individuation 
that has been presented as a challenge to the bundle theory” (Demirli 2010, 4). Of course, though, unless one assumes 
that numerically distinct but indiscernible objects are metaphysically possible, this is too strong. Adams (1979) and, 
following him, Rodriguez-Pereyra (2004) argue in favour of the metaphysical possibility of Black-like worlds on the 
basis of the possibility (seemingly accepted by everybody) of worlds containing quasi-indiscernibles, i.e., things that are 
almost indiscernible and only differ in a tiny non-essential respect. But O’Leary-Hawthorne can deny the key premise 
that this argument rests upon: namely, that there is a continuum with no ‘cut-point’ from quasi-indiscernibility to full 
indiscernibility. 
4  See Hawley (2009) for more discussion of this point.
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the problem of indiscernibility in the context of the bundle theory is not exempt from 
difficulties.
2. Rodriguez-Pereyra: Objects are Numerically Unique Bundle-Instances
 
Rodriguez-Pereyra (2004) proposes another account of individuation which, he 
contends, makes the bundle theory compatible with the existence of numerically 
distinct but indiscernible objects. Rodriguez-Pereyra’s basic idea is the following:
When a bundle is in a place, there is also another entity there, namely 
an instance of the bundle. The instance is entirely constituted by the 
universals of the bundle. But the instance and the bundle are two distinct 
entities. (Rodriguez-Pereyra 2004, 78)
In more detail, Rodriguez-Pereyra points out that the bundle theory does not include 
a commitment to the principle that identity of constituents entails numerical identity; 
and that, if such a principle is explicitly rejected, every object turns out to be numerically 
unique (and uniquely located) independently of which properties are instantiated in 
the world and how. In particular, two exactly similar objects are constituted by the 
same instantiated universals, and yet count as two distinct entities. In view of this, says 
Rodriguez-Pereyra, the bundle theory turns out to be compatible with the possibility 
of numerically distinct indiscernibles.5
Now, Rodriguez-Pereyra’s view certainly solves the problem that the bundle theory has 
with the individuation of indiscernibles. However, it has (at least) two drawbacks.
First, it explicitly assumes that whenever an object exists, there is both (see quotation 
above) a bundle and an instance of that bundle at the relevant space-time location; 
hence, it leads to an unwelcome duplication of entities.
The bundle theorist may wish to circumvent this difficulty by opting for so-called 
moderate realism. Moderate realism was initially – in the Middle Ages – the thesis that 
universals exist only in the mind of God, as patterns by which s/he creates particular 
things. Thomas Aquinas and John of Salisbury were proponents of such a view. 
According to modern-day moderate realists (see Mertz 1996), instead, every universal-
instance possesses two ontological aspects – one repeatable and one non-repeatable – at 
the same time, but these aspects do not correspond to two genuinely distinct (categories of ) 
entities. Indeed, if this is the case both individuality – determined by the non-repeatable 
aspect – and similarity – grounded in the repeatable aspect – are accounted for without 
the need to postulate a problematic numerical difference between bundles and their 
instances. However, such postulation of distinct aspects within every property-instance 
may legitimately be regarded as implausible and ad hoc.
Be this as it may, there is a second problem: Rodriguez-Pereyra’s account could be said 
5  Rodriguez-Pereyra explains that the bundle theory – construed as he presents it – in fact entails the falsity of PII.
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to betray the very spirit of realism about universals, which essentially consists in the 
rejection of primitive identities for objects. Recall the discussion of individual essences 
and haecceitates in the introduction. Now, even though Rodriguez-Pereyra doesn’t 
postulate mysterious individuating factors additional to the properties of things, he does 
attribute unique identities to the latter while, at the same time, leaving such identities 
unexplained. However, if that instances of bundles are numerically distinct is simply 
assumed, it seems to be tantamount to attributing primitive identities to instances of 
bundles. And to the extent that Rodriguez-Pereyra is understood as suggesting that the 
numerical uniqueness of instances of bundles follows from differences in location6, 
his account immediately runs into further problems. On the one hand, in the case 
of Black’s universe as well as in any other analogous putative counterexample to PII 
unambiguous individuation on the basis of spatial location is impossible. On the other 
hand, even if it were in fact possible, the proposed framework would in any case remain 
unable to allow for the possibility of co-located but non-materially-coincident objects 
– a possibility which will be discussed in detail later and that, as we will see, must be 
taken seriously in the light of contemporary physics.7
Given the foregoing, it seems fair to say that, although there are no conclusive arguments 
against either of them, both O’Leary-Hawthorne’s proposal and Rodriguez-Pereyra’s have 
shortcomings, and provide accounts of individuation in the bundle-theoretic setting 
that cannot be considered entirely satisfactory. The former establishes a distinction 
between ‘strict’ and ‘folk’ counting that may legitimately be deemed unappealing, and 
seems to have non-negligible problems with the treatment of properties. The latter 
introduces identities for instances of bundles in a way that is either left unexplained or, 
at any rate, unable to account for certain scenarios (to be looked at more closely in a 
moment) where location cannot be used to establish numerical difference. 
3. Demirli’s (Allegedly) New Proposal Based on Spatial Structure
Demirli (2010) proposes an alternative way of accounting for Black-like worlds from a 
bundle-theoretic perspective, which he deems superior to both O’Leary-Hawthorne’s 
and Rodriguez-Pereyra’s. He claims that the bundle theorist who takes Black-like 
scenarios seriously can (and should) give up the constitutional approach to individuation 
altogether.8 In particular, Demirli suggests that the bundle theorist can overcome all 
problems with Black-like scenarios by postulating irreducibly polyadic distance relations 
6   For instance, when he says that “this instance here of the bundle in question is not the same as that instance there 
of the same bundle” (Ib.).
7   In connection to this, Demirli (2010) argues that, exactly because it endows instances of bundles with primitive 
identity, Rodriguez-Pereyra’s proposal entails the empty possibility of many identical objects piled up in the same place 
at the same time, so failing to constitute a credible account of individuation. We will discuss this objection further in 
the next section, where it will become clear that it does not contradict the claim just made in the main text, and also 
that it is not compelling. Another objection formulated by Demirli that is worth mentioning is that Rodriguez-Pereyra’s 
version of the bundle theory is entirely equivalent to trope theory. This is not correct: while it is a fundamental tenet 
of trope theory that property-instances do not derive on anything more fundamental, as there simply are no repeatable 
entities, Rodriguez-Pereyra never denies that property-instances are instances of universals but ‘just’ that, if they are, 
they cannot be numerically unique. 
8   It is perhaps worth reminding the reader at this point that the constitutional approach to individuation is not an 
indispensable element of the bundle theory, which is exclusively concerned with the internal composition of objects; 
and that, consequently, dispensing with the constitutional approach to individuation, as Demirli does, doesn’t entail 
the abandonment of the bundle theory. 
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capable of individuating their relata. This means endorsing a structural approach to 
individuation, according to which the distance relations individual objects bear to 
other objects (i.e., to other ‘positions’ in the spatial structures they belong to) suffice 
for individuating them – even in the case in which the objects in question have all the 
same constituent universals. 
In more detail, Demirli accepts that compresence, the relation that ties various universals 
together into bundles (and which he takes to be irreducibly plural and multigrade), 
may give rise to qualitatively identical bundles. But, he argues, these bundles can be 
numerically distinct nonetheless, provided that they satisfy the sufficiency criterion for 
numerical diversity that he calls the ‘amended structural diversity thesis’. According to 
the amended structural diversity thesis: 
If bundles x1 … xn are mutually distant under the distance relation R
n, 
then x1 … xn are all mutually diverse (where n is a finite number). (Demirli 
2010, 10)
This allegedly enables the structural account of individuation to explain the possibility 
of indiscernible and numerically distinct individual objects, consequently making sense 
of Black’s thought-experimental scenario without postulating multiply-located objects 
(contra the O’Leary-Hawthorne strategy), but also avoiding primitive (or, at any rate, 
non-explicitly-accounted-for) identities (contra the Rodriguez-Pereyra strategy). Alas, 
Demirli’s proposal is not itself exempt from problems.
3.1. Can Distance Relations Individuate in All Cases?
A first important difficulty is that distance relations may not suffice for numerical 
distinctness. Demirli correctly argues that the Russellian idea that distance relations 
presuppose numerical diversity is question-begging. No objection to this. However, 
Demirli also states (agreeing again with Russell) that nothing can be separated by 
distance from itself. But, as shown by Hacking’s (1975) ‘re-description’ argument 
against Black-like counterexamples to PII, that distance is an irreflexive relation 
depends on the topological structure of space. In a non-Euclidean space, Black’s world 
could be interpreted as one with a single object at some distance from itself (O’Leary-
Hawthorne again!). The obvious rejoinder is that it is part of Black’s thought-experiment 
that space is Euclidean, that is, that one has zero distance only between an object and 
itself. This is true, but the important point is another. Namely, that Demirli provides 
a compelling account of Black’s world but not of Hacking’s, which represents a well-
defined, independent metaphysical possibility. And since a metaphysical account of 
individuation must (or, at least, had better) be generally valid – that is, its proponents 
must (or, at least, had better) show that it works for all possible worlds – the foregoing 
entails that Demirli’s theory of individuation is unsatisfactory.9
9  One may add a further consideration (suggested by an anonymous referee). Suppose two simple but extended 
objects exist that are indiscernible and touch each other: since they touch, there is no distance relation that individuates 
them, and so nothing that tells them apart. Demirli might reply that the centres of mass of the extended simples are at a 
non-zero distance from each other, but such a reference to the objects’ centres would be questionable given the assumed 
simplicity.
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Demirli may respond that there are independent reasons for ruling out those worlds 
in which the structural diversity thesis doesn’t apply; or for preferring the structural 
view of individuation in spite of the fact that it is only valid for some possible worlds. 
However, he doesn’t offer any argument in support of either of these claims.10
3.2. Demirli’s Structural Diversity Thesis and Weak Discernibility in Quantum 
Mechanics
Related to this there is another, more general point. Namely, that Demirli’s proposal is 
not as new as he seems to believe, and even if one modifies it on the basis of possibilities 
already explored by other authors, it still turns out to be unsuccessful.
To begin with, Demirli’s structural account is nothing but (a specific form of ) the view 
that allows for so-called ‘weak discernibility’ as a source of individuality. According to 
the latter, two things may have all the same monadic properties and yet be numerically 
distinct because they partake in an irreflexive symmetric relation (basically because, by 
its very nature, such a relation requires its relata not to be the same object, i.e., cannot 
hold between an object and itself ). This idea, first made explicit by Quine (1976), has 
been discussed in recent times in the philosophy of mathematics (Ladyman 2005) and 
of physics (Saunders 2006, Muller and Saunders 2008 and Muller and Seevinck 2009). 
Not surprisingly, it has found supporters among those sympathetic to an approach to 
ontology according to which the identities of things are (or, at least, can be) entirely 
determined by facts that are extrinsic to those things. Indeed, if it is not assumed that 
relations depend on their relata, irreflexive relations may provide an entirely qualitative 
basis for the identities of the things they relate, even if more ‘customary’ monadic 
and relational properties do not and, consequently, individuation becomes completely 
independent of the intrinsic nature of the things in question. In this context, it is clear 
that the spatial relations emphasised by Demirli are just one specific type among all the 
relations that could play the role of individuators.
Saunders (2006), for instance, applies the notion of weak discernibility with a view 
to neutralising Black’s counterexample to PII, and does this exactly on the basis of 
the ‘...is at a distance from...’ relations also employed by Demirli. However, Saunders 
immediately goes on to explain that distance relations are insufficient for guaranteeing 
numerical difference in all cases; and not just because of fancy thought-experimental 
scenarios. In particular, unlike in Black-like settings, distance relations cannot do 
the job in the case of actual physical systems such as those constituted by many 
qualitatively identical quantum particles: for, what would seem to be numerically 
distinct indiscernible objects in those systems are attributed the same location by the 
theory.11 This means that even if one assumes that space has a Euclidean structure (so 
10   Notice that the argument just presented does not hinge on whether or not Hacking is actually successful in 
presenting a physically equivalent re-description of Black’s universe (something that is convincingly put into doubt by 
French 1995), as it only concerns the metaphysical status of distance relations. In personal communication Demirli was 
happy to assume irreflexivity as a requirement for individuating relations.
11   This is because position is an observable like all the others in (standard) quantum mechanics, and it is possible 
for it to take the same value (although in probabilistic terms – but probabilities are everything the theory gives us, and 
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circumventing the difficulties with the dependence of distance relations on the overall 
spatial architecture of the universe mentioned earlier), Demirli’s structural account still 
fails to be as general as needed – this time, it would seem, because of counterexamples 
coming from the actual world and not just from a philosopher’s ingenuity. 
An immediate objection might be that in fact the mentioned examples have nothing to 
do with the actual world. This could be argued for on the basis of a general antirealist 
stance towards science that we don’t need to discuss here, as it conflicts with the 
metaphysical realism that underlies the entire discussion12 and, at any rate, makes 
the considerations in this section simply irrelevant. But it may also follow from a 
more specific and certainly less negligible worry. The worry is that the philosophical 
discussion of identity and individuality in quantum mechanics has by and large focused 
on a theory that may well be ‘standard’, but doesn’t in any way offer a satisfactory 
account of physical reality – first and foremost because it is unable to solve the 
infamous ‘measurement problem’13 – and should consequently not be regarded as a 
true description of the latter. While a detailed discussion of this is outside the scope 
of the present paper, three brief comments are in order. First, it is true that certain 
theories/interpretations alternative to the mainstream one (for instance, Bohmian 
mechanics) may solve the measurement problem – incidentally, these may also remain 
exempt from problems with indiscernibility (in Bohmian mechanics, for example, 
particles have unique space-time trajectories); but those theories meet with difficulties 
of their own, so much so that they are regarded with scepticism by vast sections (the 
majority?) of the physics community. In view of this, it seems advisable in this case 
for philosophers to ground their considerations, at least on a first instance, in what 
scientists themselves regard as the ‘standard’ theory of the relevant domain (indeed, 
this appears to be a good way of proceeding in general, but we don’t need to argue for 
this thesis here). Secondly, as it has been made clear in recent work (see, in particular, 
Muller and Seevinck 2009), the relevant results about discernibility in the quantum 
realm can also be proved for a ‘minimal theory’ that is independent of the projection 
postulate and, consequently, of the measurement problem. Third, the present critique 
of the structural account of individuation within the bundle theory doesn’t crucially 
rest on the relevant examples being actual ones: for, clearly, systems with co-located 
indiscernibles should in any case be taken into account by any metaphysical theory at 
least as possibilities (if only to show that they aren’t really possibilities after all).
Importantly, this last point allows one to see that it is not an option for Demirli to 
accept all of the above and restrict his account to middle-sized ordinary objects. For, 
besides conflicting with the sensible demand that metaphysics be made as continuous 
with science as possible, such a move would in any case be ineffective against the 
presented counterexamples, taken as representing possible systems of objects in general 
and not just systems (be they actual or just possible) of micro-objects. That is to say 
that the proposed restriction would again affect the generality of Demirli’s account.
should not be understood merely in terms of ignorance) for more than one system.
12    It is assumed here that metaphysical realism subsumes scientific realism.
13  This is the problem of explaining why we always observe/measure well-defined values for magnitudes that the 
theory describes as typically ‘superposed’ – that is, lacking precise values.
45
M. Morganti | ‘Bundles, individuation and indiscernibility
For similar reasons, things would not get any better if Demirli allowed for relations 
other than distance to individuate in the cases in which spatial separation won’t do. 
Because, while some relations might do the job in specific cases (perhaps even in all 
actual cases14), the possibility again remains open that no relation whatsoever holds that 
discerns two or more numerically distinct objects. That is, whatever happens to be the 
case, say, for quantum particles, Demirli’s theory of individuation, motivated primarily 
by the need to account for a possibility exemplified by Black’s universe, appears unable 
to account for another possibility – call it ‘Black universe with spatially coincident 
objects’.
3.3. Co-Located Objects
The foregoing naturally leads us to consider an issue that was only mentioned earlier 
(see footnote 7 above). Following Demirli, one may take it to be problematic for 
Rodriguez-Pereyra that his account makes room for the seemingly empty possibility of 
many exactly similar objects piled up in exactly the same place at the same time (the 
‘piling scenario’). But it seems to be exactly this seemingly empty possibility that we 
are now pointing at as a potential counterexample to Demirli’s own proposal. Doesn’t 
this mean that there is no problem at all for Demirli here? The answer is ‘No’ as, upon 
scrutiny, a rather relevant ambiguity can be found in Demirli’s argument that entitles 
one to say that, while he focuses on a mere pseudo-problem, Demirli himself is in fact 
unable to account for truly problematic possibilities.
Let us see this in more detail. In formulating his claim that the Rodriguez-Pereyra 
strategy is unable to deal with the piling scenario, Demirli does not specify that in the 
original formulation of this objection to primitive identity (Della Rocca 2005) it is 
explicitly added that the objects piled up share all the same constituent parts. But Della 
Rocca’s point is exactly that our intuition tells us that it makes no sense to think that 
where we see one thing there are in fact n indiscernible things all completely materially 
coinciding. The possibility of non-materially-coincident but co-located (indiscernible) 
things is a rather different one, and in fact one that – as we have seen – makes perfect 
sense not only conceptually but in view of contemporary physics. No wonder, then, 
that Della Rocca doesn’t centre his argument on the latter possibility, taking instead 
complete overlap to be a fundamental assumption in his argument!
Indeed, given the distinction just drawn, Demirli’s worry with respect to the 
Rodriguez-Pereyra strategy, turns out to be misplaced: even if instances of bundles 
possess primitive identities, it doesn’t in any obvious way follow that they can have any 
number of such identities, as it would be demanded by a piling scenario with colocated 
and materially coincident indiscernibles. On the other hand, the possibility of co-
located, non-materialy-coincident indiscernibles is instead a problem for Demirli: for, 
14  This is what Saunders, Muller and Seevinck claim: they show that irreducible spin and position/momentum corre-
lations always discern weakly in the quantum domain (they do not say that these correlations individuate, as they prefer 
to distinguish between absolutely discernible individuals and weakly discernible ‘relationals’, but this is little more than 
a terminological choice which is not relevant for our present purposes). For a dissenting voice, see Dieks and Veerstegh 
(2008).
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no individuating relation (of distance or otherwise) being available in the envisaged 
scenarios, he seems forced to rule out the possibility altogether.
In light of the above, it is legitimate to claim that Demirli’s proposal concerning 
individuation within the bundle theory is not (entirely) new and, at any rate, fails to 
achieve the level of generality required for any such metaphysical proposal.
4. Concluding Remarks 
The result of our discussion seems to be that the bundle theory is simply unable 
to account for individuation in such a way that all problems with indiscernibility 
and Black-like scenarios are defused. In particular, Demirli’s structural account of 
individuation for objects conceived of as bundles of universals is unable to solve the 
problems that it was purported to solve. Insisting on distance relations only, it falls 
short of providing an explanation of cases in which indiscernible bundles exist at 
the same place (leaving aside the need for an explanation of why non-zero distance 
relations must be – or, at least, as a contingent matter of fact invariably turn out to 
be - irreflexive). Allowing for relations of any kind to individuate might be a strategy 
as long as individuation in specific actual domains is concerned; but this option 
(beside the fact that it has been already considered by other authors, and is currently 
an object of dispute within the philosophy of science and of physics) is not sufficient 
at the general level of metaphysical possibility at which Demirli sets (as he should) his 
own discussion. For, it is at least possible that co-located, numerically distinct (but 
not materially coincident!) indiscernibles fail to be in any relation whatsoever that is 
sufficient for their individuation. All things considered, then, it looks as though as far 
as individuation is concerned the real choice for the bundle theorist is between the 
O’Leary-Hawthorne strategy and the Rodriguez-Pereyra strategy. The former having 
quite counterintuitive consequences, it seems that those who want to make sense of 
Black-type universes without allowing for multiply-located objects must eventually 
make room for primitive identities along the lines suggested by Rodriguez-Pereyra, 
perhaps modified (in moderate realist fashion) so as to avoid positing both a bundle of 
universals and a bundle-instance for each object.
As we have seen, the basic source of scepticism towards this sort of suggestion is that it 
rests on the introduction of the primitive identity that many bundle theorists (certainly 
including Demirli) are eager to get rid of. But is such an assumption truly a problem? 
It is not clear why. Most bundle theorists (as well as other philosophers) do not like 
primitive identity because it looks mysterious to them and, they claim, everything 
(individuation, similarity facts etc.) can be accounted for on the basis of qualities only, 
and so there is no need for such a puzzling factor. More specifically, bundle theorists 
deny that objects have their identities primitively, and analyse instead those identities 
in terms of the objects’ qualitative features. But, notice, bundle theorists must admit 
primitive, non-further-analysable identities at least for these qualitative features, i.e., for 
universals! Hence, they cannot get rid of primitive identities completely. The sensible 
question consequently arises whether such identities couldn’t (or, perhaps, shouldn’t) 
be allowed for property-instances too, at least as long as this brings with itself a clear 
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explanatory gain without compromising the overall consistency and plausibility of the 
view. Indeed, as we have seen, individuation does represent a problem for the bundle 
theorist, especially if s/he is not willing to just ban Black-type universes from the realm 
of the possible and/or is not ready to radically depart from common sense. And such 
a problem is certainly solved (without departing from common sense, duplicating 
entities and/or making individuation an entirely extrinsic matter – all choices that 
many would regard as unwelcome) once one acknowledges primitive identities for 
property-instances.
On the other hand, as for the overall consistency and plausibility of the view, the 
question remains whether endowing property-instances with primitive identities truly 
is in the spirit of the bundle theory. Indeed, we believe that it is not, and that there 
are good reasons for switching to nominalism. These reasons have to do with economy 
and simplicity, but also with the fact that universals as peculiar repeatable entities are 
expressly introduced with a view to solving certain problems that, all things considered, 
are left at least partly unsolved.15 However, any personal preference is immaterial for 
the arguments put forward in this paper, which only aimed to provide an objective 
critical assessment of what bundle theorists can (and did) say about the question of 
individuation and indiscernibility.16, 17 
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